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I.

THE JUNE 11 HEARING FATALLY PREJUDICED BROWN'S

The Olches brush off the June 11 hearing two hours before
trial

as

"unremarkable".

"unremarkable",

the Olches

To
assert

make
that

the

(1) everyone

hearing would be for summary judgment; and
evidence to support its claim.
A.

hearing

appear
knew

the

(2) Brown's had no

Neither assertion is correct.

The Trial Court Never Indicated the June 11 Hearing Would
be a Summary Judgment Hearing.

The concept of summary judgment arose at the June 6 hearing
only in connection with Brown's request for ten trial days.
trial court had announced it would allow only seven.
objected.

(R. 1563-64)

The

Brown's

At that point the Olches' counsel alluded

to a continuance of the June 11 trial, if the continuance would
permit the Olches to bring a summary judgment motion:
We are not afraid to try it. We are ready to try it. We
are happy to try it. If they need more time, because I
am the defendant.
I don't want to do that. All the
pressure bears on me. I don't want that.
We have counterclaim. We are very serious about it.
We need time. I would not oppose putting it off to two
weeks in August.
I have no idea what your Honor's
calendar looks like, if we could have an opportunity to
have a motion for summary judgment heard. (R. 1564)
The Olches again made this point during the same hearing:
If [Brown's] need
along with that, if we
on summary judgment.
ought not be afraid of

additional time, then I would go
could have just an hour's hearing
A modest request, I think.
We
it . . .

MR. VAN DAM: Two different things going on here.
I appreciate Mr. Burbidge's skillfully tying them
together.
I don't think the extension and a summary
judgment motion ought to be synonymous or tied together.
, . . (R.1566)
The notion of a summary judgment hearing therefore arose
solely as a possibility in the event of a continuance.
1

Nothing

occurred at the June 6 hearing that gave any notice that a summary
judgment hearing would evolve two hours before the June 11 trial.
In fact, at the June 11 hearing the Olches' counsel showed
their own understanding that the hearing was to be on purely legal
issues:

" [W] hat I want to do is keep it out of any realm of

factual question."

(R. 1321)

The mere fact that Brown's counsel

made a passing characterization of the June 11 hearing as "kind of
arguing summary judgment"

(R. 1569), does not establish that

Browns' had any forewarning the June 11 hearing would evolve into
a summary judgment hearing.

To the contrary, Brown's objected to

any effort of the trial court to do so:

"We have had very little

time. We never researched or responded to [the Olches'3 motion for
summary j udgment."1
B.

Brown's Did Not Present, and Could Not Have Presented,
All of its Evidence in the June 11 Hearing.

In their effort to convince this Court that the Court of
Appeals properly affirmed the dismissal of Brown's fraud claims as
a matter of fact, not of law, the Olches contend at page 12 of
their Brief:

"Brown's did, in fact, tell the trial court at trial

what evidence it had to support its fraud claim.

[R. 13 02-07] .

The problem was that Brown's had no evidence that was legally
sufficient to support that claim."

1

(Emphasis added).

Contrary to the Olches' assertion at page 9 of their brief
that Brown's was successful at the hearing in obtaining the
dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim based on lack of evidence,
Brown's did no such thing. The trial court raised the issue sua
sponte, and Brown's counsel gave two short answers totalling
sixteen lines to questions the trial court directly posed. (R.
1323) . The court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal as a matter of
law, not of fact. See Slip Opinion at 17-18. Brown's did not seek
dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim for "lack of evidence".
2

The Olches therefore candidly admit the trial court conducted
a trial by summary judgment with no notice.

The Olches' arrogant

assertion that Brown's produced during that two-hour hearing all
the evidence it would have introduced during a two-week trial is
palpably

fatuous.

At

trial

Brown's

would

have

introduced

handwritten notations Jon Olch, Henry Sigg or their attorney made
on a July 12, 1994 letter from Tom Brown. On page two, one of the
defendants or their attorney wrote:
unsignable

for Lessee

[Brown's]."

"Final lease -> make it

(emphasis added)

(Brown's

attaches a copy of those marginal notations as Exhibit "A") . On
November 11, 1994, shortly after receiving Brown's objections to
the

Olches'

"unsignable"

final

lease

proposal,

attorney, Gordon Strachan, wrote Jon Olch:

the Olches'

"We need to send

[Brown's] a 'termination of good faith negotiations' letter by
November 16."

(Brown's attaches a copy of that letter as Exhibit

IIQII)

Brown's marked 132 documents as exhibits for trial. Neither
the trial court nor the Court of Appeals was aware — due to the
procedure the trial court adopted — of those documents, including
the two referred to above.

Brown's documentary evidence, along

with the oral evidence it expected to offer through direct and
cross examination, presented a jury question of whether the Olches
ever intended to honor their agreement with Brown's.
The

Court

of

Appeals

has

designated

its

Opinion

for

publication. Published Utah appellate law now sanctions truncated
bench "trials" with no notice. This procedure may be an efficient
way of dispensing with jury trials, but is contrary to longstanding
legions of decisions of this Court.
3

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REEXAMINE PINGREE, SINE AND TSERN.

The Court has before it onLy a Petition for Certiorari.

In

its Petition Brown's calls the Court's attention to the fact that
§ 4.3 of Corbin, the sole non-Utah authority this Court relied on
in Tsern, is directly contrary to Tsern's holding. The simple fact
that this Court's acknowledged authority contradicts this Court's
decisions should persuade the Court that further briefing is
necessary on whether the Court should explain or overrule Pingree,
Sine and Tsern.

The conflict between those decisions and § 4.3

provides the "good reason" the Olches' assert is lacking.
The briefs to be filed upon a grant of certiorari are the
proper forum to explore the policies Corbin adopts in reaching its
conclusions.

A petition cannot adequately address those policies

in the confines of a certiorari petition. Nevertheless, one of the
Olches' own two cited authorities provides a window into some of
the policies that underlie the conclusions of § 4.3:
In contracts which make no provisions for
termination in the event future agreement is not reached
the intent of the parties becomes an issue to be
explored.

In May Metropolitan

Corp.

v.

May Oil

Burner

Corp., 290 N.Y. 260, 263-265, 49 N.E.2d 13, 15-16) the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment dismissing the
complaint insofar as it sought enforcement of a contract
containing a renewal clause providing that the precise
"quota" amounts in a distributorship agreement were "to
be mutually agreed upon." "We do not think," the court
declared, "that our search for the meaning of this
renewal clause comes to a full stop as soon as the phrase
'mutually agreed upon' is encountered." If the parties
intended the agreement to be binding only if a mutually
satisfactory agreement be reached, then "until they
arrive at that point," the court said, "there is no
contract"—but it concluded that the plaintiff should have
the opportunity of "exploring before a jury" the entire
issue of intent.
There is no practical reason why lease provisions
providing for future agreement as to some material term
4

of a contract should be excepted from the rule
articulated in May or be treated as merely precatory.
•

*

*

Thus, we hold that (1) a renewal clause in a lease
providing for future agreement on the rent to be paid
during the renewal term is enforceable if it is
established that the parties' intent was not to terminate
in the event of a failure to agree; and (2) under such
circumstances, in the absence of another standard
provided for in the agreement, the court is not precluded
from fixing a reasonable rent. To the extent that [three
specified decisions] hold to the contrary, we now
expressly overrule them. (Emphasis added).
Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d
558, 561-62, 564 (App. Div. 1979).
Schumacher
judicial

is

opinions2

apparently

one

the

could

Olches

of

the
find.

two

most

Yet

it

favorable
expressly

overruled decisions reaching the same legal conclusions as Pingree,
Sine and Tsern.

There are numerous policy reasons why this Court

should re-examine and either clarify or overrule those decisions.
In doing so, this Court should declare specifically enforceable
agreements to set renewal rents at "fair market value.3"

This

Court should grant certiorari so it can explore and consider those
policies.

2

The New York Court of Appeals reversed the opinion the Olches
rely on. See Joseph Martin Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher,
417 N.E. 2d 541 (N.Y. 1981). Corbin § 4.3 roundly criticizes that
reversal as ignoring "the obvious intent to contract and enrichment
of the landlord at the tenant's expense. . ." 1 Joseph M. Perillo,
Corbin on Contracts § 4.3 (rev. ed. 1993) at 571-72.
3

The Olches repeatedly assert that the statute of frauds dooms
Brown's claims. The statute of frauds is analytically irrelevant
because John Olch wrote Brown's on August 5, 1994: "So that there
is absolutely no misunderstanding on your part, the figure which
would be used as a 'gross volume figure from which to base
additional rent', is a figure which would compensate the landlord
for the fair market value of that leased space." (Emphasis added).
(Brown's has attached a copy of that letter as Exhibit " C " ) .
5

DATED June

S

1998.
Respectfully submitted:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By_ fkWLSL
Bruce Wycoff
A t t o r n e y s for\^gfet! r lCioners
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa
partnership; TOM BROWN; and,
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an
Iowa corporation,

]
!
]

Petitioners,
vs.

Petition No.980208

JON OLCH; JANET OLCH; HENRY
SIGG; and 330 MAIN STREET
PARTNERS,

]

Respondents.

APPENDIX

Appendix A

'Brown*

Shoe $it

COMPANY

GENERAL OFFICES • 846 HIGUERA STREET. SUITE 2
SAN LUIS OBISPO. CALIFORNIA 93401

TELEPHONE 541-2732 • AREA CODE 805

July 12, 1994

I u PLAINTIFF'S
|
EXHIBIT

FAX COPY
To: Henry Sigg

LL/u,:^3^p

FOR Y O U R EYES ONLY
Henry: Understand the following is only a
loose association of my thoughts.
This is not any sort of offer. I
look forward to hearing from you.

From: Tom Brown
Re: Outline of current lease status and options that
might be explored.
Since our meeting last Friday I have had time to reflect on some of the things
we discussed. I hope that since we met you also have spent a little time
thinking about some of the options that could be created which would be
beneficial to all of us. This letter is an attempt to share with you some insight
into my thinking about some of the possibilities that might work out. As I
suggested to you on the phone yesterday: It is impossible for me to do more
than just present my side of the equation. You are the one that knows just
where all the "players" are and what negotiations that have continued to be
played out on a day to day basis.
c Probably the most important thing to mention is that I realize just why 330
&<•"' Partners would now like to have Browns find another location. The offer from
Dansk that you have before you is very inviting I'm sure
But the fact
sus/*<+ +°
remains that Browns has moved ahead based on signed agreements for a *-c'
lease space at 330 Main Street. If Browns is now being asked to consider
other options, Brown's shouldn't also be asked to increase it's exposure
beyond what it has agree too up to this date. Browns should also be
* »
compensated for anv increased expenses it will incur.
- * o J>J>OI*OA.+*J <-ost .

Please know that I feel Brown's Shoe Fit Co. has a location to open a store in
Park City. This is a location to be built at 330 Main Street.(hereafter referred
to as "330") If no other options are made available to Brown's this is the
*->
location that we will work toward occupying, sofcqed- -ho aw<*.£) «- u ^ « . .
During our meeting last Friday you asked me if Brown's had "any contingency
• «-.*«.:- i^^-,»irtn was not ready on time or if offers made by other

c
c
\

2
interested parties in this location were to be considered by 330 Partners. At
that time I said "no". The reason for that answer was that I didn't feel at that
time, or do I currently have reason to believe, that Brown's won't be occupying
the "330" location. - D * * ' * * ^
* T\*\o\

\tt)^A - ^ ruatac i\

ons.*^t\<*V»lft.

Q^ Love*—

I fully understand 330 Partners interest in this latest offer to rent the space ruy, •
already negotiated for by Browns. If the offer of $30 a foot is indeed a
*• v u - " J
legitimate offer this is a sizeable increase in rental income to you and your
partners. Even if there is a commission that needs to be paid out of that
figure, it would still generate much more in income. In just working some of
the figures (and my knowledge is limited in knowing just what all the figures
are) it seems that there is a difference in just the first three years that could be
more than $50,000 in increased rental income. This is only using the
difference in income on the 1776 sq. ft. of the building that Brown's is
scheduled to occupy! When you figure that the anticipated $30 a foot could
also be applied to the remaining area in the building to be leased, the figure
gets to be over $100,000 difference in just the first three years.
Now having said all of this let me get down to what I think can be done by us
that might move things on a bit and be the best thing for Henry, 330 Partners
and Browns. I'm agreeable to work collaboratively to see if we can't all come
up with a solution to this situation that is in the best interest of everyone
involved. I'm sure that as I'm writing this letter you are continuing to work with
Dansk and negotiating for space that Browns is scheduled to occupy. Be
advised that Browns doesn't expect to be left "out in the street". Browns is
willing to work with you and 330 Partners on this whole matter, but we will not
be considered the "stepchild" in the negotiations.
You are the one that knows all the different players and the different offers.
Please forgive me if the following statements or assumptions that don't agree
with the facts as you know them I'm only working off of what I know! But its
seems apparent to me that the best thing is to see if we can't figure out how to
get Browns to take the location that you currently occupy at 425 Main
Street.(hereafter referred to as M425")
Browns already has a sizable investment planning to occupy "330". Unless we
can come up with something that doesn't have added financial burden to
Browns, there is really no reason for us to make any different plans than we
have been making and move ahead to occupy "330".
50(1312

3
I want to make sure this letter does not indicate to you anything other than
what it is: This letter looks at what might be worked out to benefit all of the
concerned parties! It in no way should be construed as thinking that Brown's
is willing to leave on the table it's agreement to lease space at "330" unless
further agreements for a different leased space are worked out that are
agreeable to Browns.
Before i left Park City this last time I decided that it might be best for me to do
a little "contingency planning". You tweaked my imagination on how this whole
puzzle might come together. So, after having discussed with you the possibility
of the "425" location, I went down and looked at it. As far as I can see the
only advantage of taking this room, over the one that we will be leasing, is that
it has a date of occupancy that is a little more determinable. This really is the
only evident advantage. Additionally, there are several things that make it
much less advantageous.
From the way it looks to me: A} The "usable" square feet of "425" are no
greater than the usable of "330". Although there may be an additional 200 sq.
ft. in "425", the actual usable doesn't seem to be any greater. So both rooms
are approximately the same in size. B} There is no question that the cost to
remodel/fixture "425" will be greater to Browns than design and fixture of "330".
C} The anticipated rental of "425" would cost Browns at least $16,000 more
for the first three years.
Henry: I could go into all sort of calculations, figures and suppositions that
could be used to support an argument that Browns shouldn't even consider a
move from "330" to "425". The move doesn't make a lot of sense for Browns.
But if you really are interested in getting Browns in business and 330 Partners
a higher paying tenant into "330", then we should try to hammer out some sort
n
of agreement. This would also avoid any sort of possible future confrontation
^ ,
and get this whole matter resolved. From my point of view, it seems that
* ty
330 Partners should be coming to Browns with some sort of offer to get '
us to take "425". If they are seriously considering and offer from Dansk It
Is solely to their benefit to see if Browns won't consider a possible move
to another location. I really don't know why I should be all hot and bothered
to make any additional commitments. Did I miss something here?
50G313
Mr,,., howinn niupn the fnmnina statements, let me give you some idea of what

4

knowledge I have of the rents/agreements currentlv in place and these
anticipated to be made in the future •
1) Browns would consider ar ofter to move ri»r t's "3':-T location
to "425" if there are no additic i a- costs, wowso \. • Brow r..
'

.p/*7

2) Browns would have to work out a mutually agreeable lease with > ^ y v
the landlord at "425".
' ^

V i

V*
3) Because of the difference in the average rental that Browns
,,£
M
would be required to pay at "42T compared tc 'T T c- • *h*
o?
course of the first three years and tr e addit, »n;*; i*i.-K u:',»,*;ia- wii , ^ ^
be necessary to remodel/fixture "42:" com ar^d (u 3'.: ', Bowns
would expect an up front payment of $25,000 in order to make the
move.
4) If there is a monetary settlement that needs to oe made with
you, in order to move your business out of "425" (and maybe a
settlement to the other tenant in "425") this amount would need to
be negotiated with 330 Partners. I'm sure 330 Paitners s-t that
even if there are some up front costs to getting an agreer:.**.-»t
worked out for Browns to move to "425" that this is to their benefit
in order to get their $30 a foot tenant. Keep in'mind: Browns
gets no benefit by giving up their lease space in "330" If 330
Partners can make positive steps in order to ha' o -i-owns pack
their bags and go down the street to "425" they -vcuid the^ 'iave
the freedom to sign a tenant for $30 a foot for the entire building.
I'm sure you have figured out how much Browns agreeing to move
into "425" would mean in additional income at "330".
Please note that I have not tried to share in what I anticipate will be a rather
large profit by 330 Partners by Browns moving to "425". They need to
recognize that I'm willing to give them the opportunity to kase the space they
have already agreed to lease to Browns, but I don't see how they could
possibly expect Browns to shoulder any additional burden without some
5QG314
compensation.

M e a s e Know llicai, i a;u m u i c u»u.i «•«.-.. a •

5CC315

5
out to everyone's benefit
involved.

But it has to be fair and reasonable to everyone

I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely^^-

Tom

5CG316

Appendix B

STRACHAN & STRACHAN
.A UMITK) Luioirr COMTANT
OldCrtvH?II.Upcuin
520 KUif i Street

P.(\Bck37l7
P*i k Oty. Uah 64060-3747
TM (601) M9-4111 Fax ($01) 643-942S

November 1 1 f 1994

Jon -Olch
BALD EAGLK REALTY
P.O. Dox '2040
255 Main Street
Parte City, Utah futwo
Ro:

Brown'c .Shoe. Pit

Dear Jon:
Enclosed 1 P Brownie Shoo Pit counsol'c roeponee to
our prbposed lease. • Atter you have reviewed it, please
call me. Wo nood to .send them a "termination of good
t'aith negotiations'" lAttior by November 16.
Sincerely,
STRACHAN & SlJRACHAH

Cordon Strachan

/ J^^O

GS 2 Vw

Enclosure

PLAINTIFF*
EXHIBIT

/A3
^>5^

AJD.^5--^3m^^J

50CJ354

Appendix C
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PLAINTIFF'S
|
EXHIBIT

M

•I

^

August 5, 1994

Mr. Tom Brown
Brown's Shoe Fit Company
846 Higuera Street, #2
San Luis Obispo, CA 93410
Re:

Possible Lease Terms: 330 Main Street
Park City, Utah

Dear Tom:
I have recently been advised by Henry Sigg of one or more telephone conversations
between you and Henry regarding your intention to lease the above referenced property. Henry
has informed me that you apparently consider the letter of intent (which was signed by you and
Henry last March 18th) as a binding lease agreement. As you may not be aware, my wife,
Janet, and I are the owners of the property on which we propose to build a commercial building
in which you would like to lease retail space. The purpose of this letter is to let you know the
position of myself and Janet regarding your intention to lease space in this building.
I was involved in one meeting with you regarding your possible lease of space. This took
place last February. In pursuing the financing for the proposed building, the bank wanted us to
have a letter of intent from a prospective tenant in order to make a preliminary determination as
to the viability of a construction loan and permanent loan for the building. In that context,
Henry was instructed to prepare a preliminary letter of intent for use in the bank's evaluation of
a possible loan application. Henry was not instructed by me or Janet; nor was he authorized by
either of us to enter into a lease or any other agreement of ^ny kind.
The document which you signed on March 18th was, in terms of my understanding, a
preliminary letter of intent that was prepared in the context of our discussions last February, and
specifically, for the purpose of a possible loan application, and was subject to normal lease
negotiations. In February it made no business sense to enter into a lease agreement with anyone
at that early stage in the process. It barely makes sense now. In either event, it makes even less
business sense to do so in a single sheet of paper. I am now informed by Henry that it is you
position that this is a firm lease agreement. If that is in fact your position, I must inform your
that both Janet and I respectfully disagree with you.

500320
255 Main Street • P.O. Box 2040 • Park City, Utah 84060
Phone: 801-649-4212 • Fax: 801-649^232 • Toll Free: 1-800-645^212

Let me explain to you what my areas of concern are as it relates to your intention to lease
the space in this building. First of all, Henry's discussions with you (and my brief discussion)
operated on the basic premise that the building would be ready for occupancy by the end of
1994. The per square foot lease rates discussed in the letter of intent also presumed occupancy
by the end of this year. If you are not already aware, I need to inform you that in view of the
present project approval delays at Park City Municipal Corporation, I cannot anticipate
commencing construction until this fall, if then. We will under no circumstances be in a position
to deliver a completed building by the end of this year. Therefore, the base lease rate will need
to be reevaluated to correspond with a 1995 (completion date for the building.
With further reference to the lease rate, you will note that the March 18th document
refers to two separate option periods and the need for the parties to come to an agreement on
what the lease rate will be at the commencement of those option terms. So that there is
absolutely no misunderstanding on your part, the figure which would be used as a "gross volume
figure from which to base additional rent*, is a figure which would compensate the landlord for
the fair market value of that leased space. In other words, at minimum, the lease rate at the
commencement of the first and second option periods would be reflective of the fair market value
for that space at the time the respective options are exercised. That is why the language is in
there.
Furthermore, as was clearly understood at the time, I would need to be in a position to
recapture some of the losses incurred during the first three years of the lease as a result of
offering a lower entry lease rate as a inducement to the tenant to come in and establish a new
business. Stated simply the entry rate is subsidized. The recapture of the rent subsidy woulc
also have to be factored in to the base rate calculated for each of the two option periods. Before
there can be a binding lease, we would need to negotiate, among other items discussed above,
the specific language for the option periods.
In addition to the subject of the lease rate, there is equally significant factor of the actual
space in the building which you intend to occupy. In my discussions with you last February, as
well as in discussions you have had with Henry, you discussed aspects of all three of the floors
in the building, with no precise determination of the final configuration for the lease space. It
is not clear to me now, nor was it clear to me last February, just exactly what space you intended
to finally occupy upon completion of the building. I think you can clearly understand the
difficulty in assessing a generic lease rate when you may occupy one of more floors in the
building including the main floor.
I think the above discussion points out the concerns I have in your apparent assertion that
you have a binding lease agreement with me. There are simply too many very significant issues
that have not been resolved at this time - not in the least of which is that fact that our discussions
early last spring anticipated your occupancy of a building this coming December. That is simply
not going to happen. Although I can certainly understand your frustration, I think you can
understand my position. Regardless of any differences we may have at present, let me assure
you that I am willing to sit down and personally discuss with you the terms under which I would
Be willing to enter into a binding lease agreement.

5Q0321

If we can work out the appropriate specific language in a manner that is acceptable to
both of us, we can then move forward with a lease. We are still interested in pursuing
discussions with you, but there are a lot of issues to be resolved. I would suggest that we delay
any firm discussions until such time as I complete the approval process with Park City. When
the approval process is completed, I will be able to obtain some accurate construction cost figures
which will enable us both to realistically look at lease rates and the related issues of completion
and occupancy dates, etc.
Again, I regret the misunderstanding that has developed and I am hopeful that when this
project is approved by the City, we can sit down and hammer out a mutually satisfactory lease
agreement. If you are willing to pursue lease negotiations based on the input I have provided
you in this letter, please let me know by August 15, 1994. If I do not hear back from you by
that date, I will assume that you have no interest in pursuing a lease. In the event you do contact
me, I would request that we meet jointly with Henry so that we are all in agreement. I look
forward to hearing from you.
Smcerely,

Jon Olch
cc:

Henry Sigg
Janet Olch

5CC322

